QUOTE(Gabriel @ Jul 20 2008, 18:57)

(btw there are not that many computer that should really be "single user", even in homes there are often several people using a single computer)
"User Accounts" are a half-assed approach to multiuser environments though, because the idea comes back from times, where HD-space was an issue. They try to seperate apps, from settings and media and do not employ any actual external security (all the security is only OS-internal - as soon as you access the storage from another software, you have full unlimited access). It is this half-assed approach plus stupid stuff like "centralized setting-storages" like registry, which to a large extend is responsible for all the complexity, problems and buerocracy in nowadays OSes.
The truth is that interface-level, app-level and media-level security and multiuser-support doesn't even need hardwired OS support! Check this out:
- All data except of OS and driver stuff is stored in encrypted filesystem images (truecrypt anyone?)
- This includes the user-environment which is just a "portable" application stored in that image (partially possible already).
- It also includes the applications, which are stored in that image, including their settings (portable apps do that already)
- And of course the users media
- multiple of such filesystem images can be mounted at the same time. Thus you can for example also mount an encrypted USB-stick or external HDD and then access it - if you know the PW.
- Thus, the OS doesn't even need to know "who" is currently using the PC. Users manage their privacy and security themselves simply by mounting/unmounting their encrypted images.
- User runs with very low access rights to the OS. Thus, he can do whatever he wants inside his images, but cannot damage the OS..... unless he knows the pass to elevate his rights. Interestingly, although he runs at such low privileges, he isn't constantly bothered with access-limitations, because he only needs to elevate his rights if he wants to do something to the OS.
- The OS automatically forbids any modification of unmounted images, unless one elevates ones access rights (thus, any app-level security breach can only affect the currently mounted images).
- add some mechanism to shield password entering during mounting from app-level keyloggers.
What you get:
- all the security of nowadays systems, and significantly more, without all the hassle
- no setups, package-managers, installations or deinstallations (except of just more comfortable "extractors"). Thus, also none of the downsides associated with those.
- easy backups of your data (just copy the image-file(s) and done!)
- full portability of apps, settings and data - from anywhere to anywhere.
- true privacy.... no centrally logged usage-data, own apps and media are internally and externally unaccessable. No worries about recovery of deleted data (as long as your image-encryption isn't broken)
- various niceties for corporate environments